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A MORE PERFECT NATION:  ENDING RACIAL 
PROFILING 
Russell L. Jones* 
[O]ur country must abandon all the habits of racism, because 
we cannot carry the message of freedom and the baggage of 
bigotry at the same time.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The above quote from the second inaugural address of President 
George W. Bush is a reminder to Americans that all is not well on the 
“home front.”  Semblances of the denial of liberty and freedom that 
President Bush’s address deplores in other countries still exist in 
America.  Images from the natural disaster in Louisiana caused by 
Hurricane Katrina emphasize the disdain that America has shown for 
her poor, who are mostly black and brown.2 
A recent Texas study indicates that in certain areas in the United 
States, blacks and Latinos are searched at higher rates than Anglos 
following a traffic stop.3  The traffic stop, the basis for most 
investigations resulting in racial profiling, although legal, is usually a 
                                                          
*  J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law, Southern University Law Center.  Special thanks to 
Professor Sanjay Chhablani, Syracuse University School of Law for his comments and 
constructive criticism.  Also, I would like to thank my research assistant Brandy Citizen. 
1 President George W. Bush, Address at the 55th Inaugural Ceremony (Jan. 20, 2005), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/index.html. 
2 Yahoo!News Photo, In the USA, Whites Find and Blacks Loot (Jan. 23, 2006), 
http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2005/Whites-Find-Blacks-Loot30aug05.htm.  Two 
photos released on the same day, one of a white couple carrying food, and the other of a 
black man doing the same, were heavily circulated throughout the media and internet for 
their controversial captions.  The first picture stated that the “[t]wo residents wade through 
chest-deep water after finding bread and soda from a local grocery store . . .  ”  Id.  Yet the 
second picture, although synonymous to the first, stated that the young black man “walks 
through chest deep flood water after looting a grocery . . .  ”  Id.  This serves as just one of 
many instances where the media alone negatively depicts people of color and continues to 
promote racial profiling.  Id. 
3 “Blacks and Latinos in Texas were significantly more likely than Anglos to be 
searched following a traffic stop by Texas law enforcement agencies in 2002: approximately 
6 of every 7 law enforcement agencies reported racial disparities between non-Anglo and 
Anglo search rates.”  DWIGHT STEWARD, STEWARD RES. GROUP, TEX. CRIM. JUSTICE REFORM 
COAL., RACIAL PROFILING: TEXAS TRAFFIC STOPS AND SEARCHES—A FIRST LOOK AT THE 
NATION’S MOST COMPREHENSIVE RACIAL PROFILING DATASET 10 (Feb. 2004), 
http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/userfiles/racial_profiling/2004_rp_report.p
df [hereinafter STEWARD, RACIAL PROFILING] (emphasis omitted); see also DAVID A. HARRIS, 
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S 
HIGHWAYS 2 (June 1999), available at http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racialprofiling/ 
15912pub19990607.html [hereinafter HARRIS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK]. 
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pretext used by police officers to search for drugs in situations where 
there is no other legitimate basis to conduct the search.  Additionally, 
cases indicate that border patrol officers stop people of Mexican descent 
more often than other ethnic groups.4  In fact a “Mexican appearance” is 
the most salient factor considered when deciding who to stop to 
investigate illegal border crossings.5   
In cases involving racial profiling, government officials use the race 
or ethnicity of an individual to suggest criminal activity.6  The practice 
singles out an individual not because of his criminal activity, but because 
of his race or ethnicity.7  Racial profiling is founded on the premise that 
racial or ethnic minorities inherently commit certain crimes.8  For several 
reasons, the use of race as the determining factor to identify criminal 
qualities is an ineffective tool in law enforcement investigations.  It 
“perpetuate[s] negative racial stereotypes that are harmful to our rich 
and diverse democracy, and materially impair[s] our efforts to maintain 
a fair and just society.”9  It not only undermines our constitutional rights, 
it undermines the trust on which law enforcement depends to effectively 
protect communities.10   
Racial profiling by police officers has done more to divide 
Americans and perpetuate bigotry than any other form of racism.  It 
diminishes any progress that has been made by America to achieve 
racial equality and fair treatment of all its citizens.  Racial profiling 
perpetuates a caste system in the American criminal justice system and 
is a form of racism that America must abandon if she intends to set an 
                                                          
4 See generally United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).  Border officers on 
roving patrol stopped defendant’s car, saying later their only reason for doing so was the 
occupants’ apparent Mexican descent.  Id. at 874-75. 
5 Id. 
6 Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug 
Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 654 (2002).  ‘“[R]acial profiling’ occurs 
when a law enforcement officer questions, stops, arrest, searches, or otherwise investigates 
a person because the officer believes that members of that person’s racial or ethnic group 
are more likely than the population at large to commit the sort of crime the officer is 
investigating.”  Id. 
7 Gene Callahan & William Anderson, The Roots of Racial Profiling, REASON MAG., Aug.-
Sept. 2001, at 2 (explaining that when defining racial profiling that “the reason for the stop 
is a statistical profile of the detainee’s race or ethnicity”). 
8 See Gross & Barnes, supra note 6. 
9 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE USE OF RACE BY FEDERAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (June 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/ 
documents/guidance_on_race.htm [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE]. 
10 End Racial Profiling Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 3847 Before the Sub. Comm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 108th Cong. 249 (2004) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr. 
of Michigan). 
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example of freedom for other nations.  However, public and political 
attention to this phenomenon has waned.  The discussion of racial 
profiling is only heard in the context of terrorism and passing 
conversations when some act of police brutality occurs.  Efforts to 
eradicate racial profiling and the racist presumptions that give birth to it 
have become dormant.  It is important to restart the conversations and 
studies of racial profiling to reach solutions to the problem.   
A. Failed Efforts To Address Racial Profiling 
Both former President William J. Clinton and current President 
George W. Bush have condemned the practice of racial profiling and 
recognized it as an anathema to effective law enforcement.  Former 
President Clinton characterized it as “deeply corrosive” and “morally 
indefensible.”11  President George W. Bush has said that it is “wrong and 
we will end it.”12   
After President Bush’s statement in 2001 describing racial profiling 
as “wrong,” he signed a White House memorandum requesting that the 
Attorney General “review the use by Federal law enforcement 
authorities of race as a factor in conducting stops, searches, and other 
investigative procedures.”13  In response, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft instructed the Civil Rights Division of the Department of 
Justice to develop guidance to address the problem of racial profiling.  
These efforts resulted in a policy guidance for federal law enforcement 
officers.14    
However, the federal guidance enacted by the Attorney General’s 
office is a vain attempt to address the real problem of racial profiling.  
                                                          
11 Steven A. Holmes, Clinton Orders Investigation on Possible Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 10, 1999, at A22 (quoting a statement made by President William J. Clinton in a 
conference with civil rights leaders and police leaders in his address at the Justice 
Department Conference) (internal quotations omitted).  President Clinton stated, “While 
public confidence in the police has been growing steadily overall, people of color continue 
to have less confidence and less trust, and believe they are targeted for action . . . ”  Law 
Enforcement Practice of Racial Profiling Under Fire (June 9, 1999), http://cnnstudentnews. 
cnn.com/US/9906/09/race.police.02/.  He called racial profiling a morally indefensible, 
deeply corrosive practice and emphasized that “‘[r]acial profiling is in fact the opposite of 
good-police work where actions are based on hard facts, not stereotypes . . . . It is wrong, it 
is destructive, and it must stop.’”  Holmes, supra, at A22. 
12 President George W. Bush, Address to the Joint Session of Congress 4 (Feb. 17, 2001), 
reprinted in 147 Cong. Rec. H433 (2001), available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2001/02/20010228.html. 
13 President George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 27, 2001), 
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010228-1.html. 
14 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE, supra note 9. 
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First, it does not carry the force of law.  Specifically, the policy guidance 
provides standards for federal law enforcement agencies in conducting 
investigations which may involve race or ethnicity,15 but it does not 
impose any sanctions on an officer who may engage in the prohibited 
conduct, nor does it provide a remedy for a citizen who may be the 
target of racial profiling.16  Also, the federal guidance policy is a federal 
standard and does not restrict states or local law enforcement agencies 
where the vast majority of criminal investigations are conducted.17    
Further, the definition contained in the federal guidance loosely 
defines racial profiling.18  It states that “‘Racial profiling’ . . . concerns the 
invidious use of race or ethnicity as a criterion in conducting stops, 
searches and other law enforcement investigative procedures.”19  The 
policy guidance does not suggest criteria that will help determine when 
an officer has engaged in racial profiling of a suspect.  It does not 
indicate what a complainant must show to prove a case of racial 
profiling.20  Thus, the definition proposed by the policy guidance does 
not detail how racial profiling is determined; it only says that the 
practice is wrong.   
Most importantly, the policy guidance does not address what has 
become the most pressing issues concerning profiling by ethnicity since 
9/11.21  It permits federal law enforcement officials to use ethnicity when 
investigating or preventing threats to national security.22  The only limits 
placed on the use of ethnicity in these instances are that officials must 
meet the standards permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.23  With the enactment of the Patriot Act, what is permitted by law 
                                                          
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 See ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES & 
EXPLANATIONS 2 (4th ed. 2004). 
18 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE, supra note 9. 
19 Id. at 1. 
20 Proving racial profiling has been an almost insurmountable obstacle for victims.  
There is no Fourth Amendment remedy for the practice, and under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, the victim must show disparate treatment and an intent 
to discriminate.  This burden has been arduous.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-
43 (1976) (requiring claimants to prove discriminatory intent in order to establish that a 
policy, discriminatory in its application, violates the Equal Protection Clause); see also Anne 
Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After 
United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1072-74 (1997). 
21 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE, supra note 9, at 5. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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is amorphous at best.24  This is most clearly seen by the unilateral act of 
spying on Americans that President Bush recently condoned as legal in 
times when national security is threatened by terrorists—a decision that 
has seemingly increased the gap of mistrust many Americans have for 
the Executive Branch.25 
In addition to President Bush’s and Attorney General Ashcroft’s 
efforts, two bills were introduced in Congress aimed at prohibiting racial 
profiling.26  Although the attempts at federal legislation are starts, they 
are somewhat inconsistent in their efforts and are incomplete.  The 
federal bills, introduced in Congress over a year ago, lay dormant 
without action by either the House or Senate.  The bills were sent to 
committee where they remain at the time of this research.27  Such 
inaction indicates that legislators do not consider racial profiling to be an 
important topic or a drastic enough problem for them to tackle. 
If the evils of racial profiling are to be eliminated as a thorn in the 
American criminal justice system’s side, the lackadaisical attitude taken 
by all three branches of the government must change.  The Court must 
firmly state that racial profiling is an affront on the freedoms guaranteed 
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the 
Fourth Amendment.28  Additionally, the legislative branch must enact 
laws that will affect state policies on the topic and send a consistent 
                                                          
24 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The USA Patriot Act:  Preserving Life and Liberty, 
www.lifeandliberty.gov/highlights.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2006). 
25 Bush: ‘No Doubt’ NSA Surveillance Is Legal (Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.prisonplanet. 
com/articles/january2006/290106surveillance.htm (President George W. Bush defended 
his program of warrantless surveillance saying, “‘There’s no doubt in my mind it is legal.’ 
. . . [The program] ‘is designed to protect civil liberties,’ and . . . ‘it’s necessary.’”); see also 
Dan Eggen, Bush Authorized Domestic Spying, (Dec. 16, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/16/AR20051216000 
21.html (“It’s clear that the administration has been very willing to sacrifice civil liberties in 
its effort to exercise its authority on terrorism, to the extent that it authorizes criminal 
activity . . . .”) (quoting Caroline Fredrickson, Director of Washington Legislative Office, 
American Civil Liberties Union). 
26 S. 2132, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2112, 108th Cong. (2004). 
27 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
28 The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part “nor shall any state deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  The 
Fourth Amendment provides, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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resounding message condemning racial profiling.  However, to 
accomplish this feat, several questions must be honestly assessed.  First, 
can race ever be a factor in criminal investigations?  If race can be a 
factor, what role should it play in defining who to stop and investigate?  
Moreover, if race can be a factor, what can be done to ensure that it is not 
the “determining factor” in criminal investigations? 
This research reopens the discussion on racial profiling and suggests 
remedies that may help eradicate a problem that cuts at the core of 
discrimination in America.  Part II of this Article discusses the 
backlashes of racial profiling and why it is the anathema that will cause 
America to lose credibility in her efforts to democratize other societies.  
Further, Part II discusses the importance of taking affirmative action to 
eliminate racial profiling from certain police investigations.  Part III 
addresses criminal investigations and profiling, and how race and 
ethnicity have become accepted factors for reasonable suspicion in 
certain crimes, while Part IV suggests a judicial remedy that may help 
eliminate the most insidious forms of racial profiling from police 
investigations. 
II.  THE ILLS OF RACIAL PROFILING 
Cases and studies indicate that racial profiling is most likely to occur 
in drug crime investigations, whether they are conducted by state and 
local police officers or federal Drug Enforcement Agents, or crimes that 
are related to enforcing laws against illegal immigration.29  David Harris 
has stated that the “war on drugs” is significantly to blame for the abuse 
of police officers powers when making stops.30   “Racial profiling is 
based on the premise that most drug offenses are committed by 
minorities.”31  Thus, police officers looking for drugs will stop drivers 
based on the color of their skin.32  A further analysis of racial profiling 
                                                          
29 See DEBORAH RAMIREZ, JACK MCDEVITT & AMY FARRELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A 
RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS: PROMISING PRACTICES 
AND LESSONS LEARNED 4 (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/ 
184768.pdf [hereinafter RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS]; see also NEW JERSEY 
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM 
REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING (Apr. 20, 1999), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf. 
30 HARRIS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK, supra note 3, at 2. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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suggests that brown skin and Mexican ancestry will alert officers 
investigating illegal immigration.33 
A. Specific Problems of Racial Profiling 
As Randall Kennedy explains it, the practice of racial profiling 
requires blacks and Mexican-Americans to pay a type of racial tax for the 
war against drugs and illegal immigration that whites and other groups 
escape.34  The racial tax penalizes innocent victims of color for the 
misconduct of others who also happen to be black or Mexican-
American.35  Police officers who use the practice of racial profiling to 
investigate drug trafficking or illegal immigration stop and search blacks 
and Hispanics at a far greater rate than their share of the population, and 
also at a far greater rate than their rate of offending.36  The frequency of 
these selective stops compared to the number of stops of other racial or 
ethnic groups for these type of crimes suggests that the race of 
individuals investigated is a predominant consideration in determining 
who to stop.  Thus, blacks and Hispanics are burdened or taxed 
unreasonably in the effort to curtail drug trading, other drug crimes, and 
illegal immigration.37   
                                                          
33 See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 
239-40 (2002).  Alschuler references the opinions of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873 (1975) and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), stating that the 
prevalence of illegal immigration across the Mexican border “had a brown face.” Id. 
34 RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 161 (1997).  One solution that 
Kennedy suggests to ending the racial tax is placing a tax across the board on all citizens for 
these ills.  Id.  He states 
Instead of placing a racial tax on blacks, Mexican-Americans, and other 
colored people, governments should, if necessary, increase taxes across 
the board.  More specifically, rather than authorizing police to count 
apparent Mexican ancestry or apparent blackness as negative proxies, 
states and the federal government should be forced either to hire more 
officers or to inconvenience everyone at checkpoints by subjecting all 
motorists and passengers to questioning (or to the same chance at 
random questioning).  The reform I support, in other words, does not 
entail lessened policing.  It only insists that the costs of policing be 
allocated on a nonracial basis. 
Id. 
35 Id. at 160. 
36 See Jennifer A. Larrabee, “DWB (Driving While Black)” and Equal Protection: The Realities 
of an Unconstitutional Police Practice, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 291, 296-97 (1997); see also Wesley M. 
Oliver, With an Evil Eye and Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial 
Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1423-25 (2000). 
37 Supra note 34. 
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Additionally, racial profiling places a social stigma on the targeted 
groups, who are black and brown citizens.38  When police officers 
indiscriminately stop people of color to investigate them for certain 
crimes, a subliminal message is sent to the entire society suggesting that 
people of color are more inclined to engage in unacceptable activity.   
Consider Jerry Kang’s statement that “[i]f it bleeds, it leads.”39  
Sensationalistic crime stories are disproportionately shown with racial 
minorities repeatedly featured as violent criminals.40  Consumption of 
these images intensifies our implicit biases against racial minorities, a 
form of cognition Kang refers to as “[r]acial schema[ ].”41  Consequently, 
black and brown citizens are labeled by the unaffected portion of society 
as criminals and they are generally feared.42  White citizens and even 
some well-to-do members of the targeted groups will avoid the harassed 
citizens and their communities at all costs.  Civil rights leader Reverend 
Jesse Jackson acknowledged the existence of subconscious stereotyping 
against minorities when he publicly recalled his own statement that 
“‘There is nothing more painful for me at this stage in my life than to 
walk down the street and hear footsteps and start to think about robbery 
and then look around and see it’s somebody white and feel relieved.  
How humiliating.’”43  This attitude of “avoid that community” stifles the 
positive traffic flow of business from the general society into 
communities where persons of the targeted groups may live or frequent.  
These areas suffer economically and eventually become strongholds of 
poverty and crime. 
Furthermore, racial profiling can be a source of tension and distrust 
between the police and minorities.44  If the criminal justice system is to 
meet its goal of crime detection and prevention, it must have the trust of 
the communities it serves.45  When law enforcement practices used to 
                                                          
38 David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of 
Fourth Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No, 73 MISS. L.J. 423, 455 (2003) 
[hereinafter Harris, Using Race].  “Racial profiling stigmatizes and penalizes, whether 
intentionally or not, on the basis of membership in a group.”  Id. 
39 Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1495 (2005) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
40 Id. at 1495. 
41 Id. at 1498.  Kang defines a schema as a cognitive structure that represents knowledge 
about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those 
attributes.  Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Nelson Lund, The Conservative Case Against Racial Profiling in the War on Terrorism, 66 
ALB. L. REV. 329, 333 (2003). 
44 See Harris, Using Race, supra note 38, at 3. 
45 Id. 
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stop and investigate minorities are perceived as biased and unfair, 
minority citizens will have less confidence in the criminal justice system, 
and thus, will report crimes infrequently, will not be witnesses at trials, 
or will not serve as jurors.46   
Last, racial profiling creates a sense of disconnect from the general 
society for the targeted groups.  A police policy that continuously targets 
a race or ethnic group for criminal activity indicates to members of the 
group that they are pariah.47  They begin to feel that the protections that 
are given to other races or ethnic groups will not be extended to them.48  
Such a decline in trust leads to a lack of cooperation between police and 
the targeted groups, which ultimately results in the reduction of criminal 
deterrence.49  The targeted groups begin to sense that they have been 
separated from the larger community.50  
B. Using Race To Determine Who To Stop 
Studies done in New Jersey, Maryland, Texas, and New York have 
shown that African-Americans and Latinos are stopped for traffic 
violations at a much higher rate than Anglo-Americans.51  A recent Texas 
study indicates that not only are African-Americans and Latinos stopped 
at higher rates, but that blacks and Latinos are searched at a greater rate 
as well.52  These statistics are antithetical to studies which indicate that 
African-American and Latinos do not engage in crime at a rate greater 
than their percentage of the population.53  This data on stops and 
                                                          
46 Id. 
47 Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 
28 (2003).  “[W]hen officers employ racial profiling to stop young African American males 
walking down the street, the officers insult and degrade the young men and their racial 
groups, making them feel less than full members of the American polity.”  Id. 
48 Id. 
49 R. Richard Banks, Racial Profiling: Race, Policing and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 
573 (2003); see also RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS, supra note 29. 
50 This sensation of contemporary segregation and its detrimental effects are 
synonymous to those of the petitioners in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 
1952).  In Brown, the Supreme Court held that segregation “generates a feeling of inferiority 
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone.”  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
51 See Anthony E. Mucchetti, Driving While Brown: A Proposal for Ending Racial Profiling in 
Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2005); see also STEWARD, RACIAL 
PROFILING, supra note 3; Gross & Barnes, supra note 6, at 660; Larrabee, supra note 36; Floyd 
Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in the Selective Enforcement of 
Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 746 (2004). 
52 See STEWARD, RACIAL PROFILING, supra note 3. 
53 See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Shaping of Chance: Actuarial Models and Criminal Profiling 
at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 105, 123 (2003).  The growing data 
on racial profiling demonstrates that “the hit rate for drugs and weapons in police searches 
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investigations of blacks and Latinos suggests that police officers are not 
color blind and that race or ethnicity is a factor used in determining who 
to stop and search. 
The above being said, society expects law enforcement officers to 
take proactive steps to ensure that citizens are safe from crimes against 
person and property.  The ideal state of law enforcement would be “one 
in which most crimes are deterred, and those which are not are 
intercepted before an innocent person has been harmed by a criminal.”54  
In an ordinary criminal investigation, absent a crime being committed in 
the presence of the officer or an identification of a known suspect, an 
officer’s belief that something is criminally awry is generally based on a 
profile.55  To this end, police officers will use variables such as “sex, 
manner of dress, age group, criminal history, marital status, level of 
education, location, and time of day” to assess criminal activity.56  In 
these instances, police departments collect data about criminal activity to 
help them predict who is most likely to engage in certain crimes and 
where future criminal activity may occur.57  Profiling in this context “can 
be defined as a broad method of targeting police resources based on 
where they are most likely to encounter crime.”58  The collected data is 
designed to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of police work by 
directing department resources into areas where the goals of crime 
prevention and detection can be better achieved.59  
For example, a certain neighborhood has experienced a series of 
daytime burglaries on Sunday mornings or a particular area of town is 
known to be frequented by suspected drug dealers.  The police 
department may increase officers’ presence in these areas at certain 
hours to combat the prevailing trend of crime.  This method of profiling, 
known as geographical “crime-mapping,” speculates about the future 
based on past facts and it places officers in areas where it is perceived 
                                                                                                                                  
of African Americans is the same as or lower than the rate for whites.” Id. (emphasis 
omitted); see also William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating 
Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 17 (2004). 
54 Brandon del Pozo, Guided by Race: An Ethical and Policy Analysis of Racial Profiling in 
Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 1 QUEENSLAND U. TECH. L. & JUST. J. 266, 272 (2001). 
55 Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 986-87 (1999). 
56 del Pozo, supra note 54, at 276. 
57 Id. at 272. 
58 Id. at 275. 
59 Id. at 272. 
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that certain crimes will occur.60  The purpose is to deter crime before it 
happens or detect the crime before damage is done in the community. 
Considering the above methods of profiling, can race be a factor in 
the equation used to determine who to stop and investigate or does the 
use of race violate constitutional protections?  Should race be considered 
in developing police policy to determine who will be targeted for certain 
criminal violations?  If race is a permissible factor, what amount of 
weight should it be given?  Will it become the predominant factor?  Will 
the use of race distort criminal investigations?  These questions will 
guide the discussion in the remainder of this research. 
III.  CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, POLICE POLICY, AND RACIAL PROFILING 
A primary goal of American criminal law is to define what behavior 
is morally unacceptable and to punish those who engage in such 
behavior.61  Criminal statutes are enacted to help accomplish these 
purposes.62  Law enforcement agencies, in their efforts to protect citizens 
from crimes and arrest those who commit crimes, develop policies 
designed to detect, prevent, and reduce criminal activity.63  Effective and 
constitutional police policies will not infringe on the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the people, but they must be developed and applied in 
a manner that will accomplish their stated goals.64  For example, a policy 
that allowed for searches of citizens’ homes on a policeman’s hunch that 
criminal activity is afoot would result in a loss of confidence in the 
criminal justice system that would outweigh any benefit of crime 
prevention, detection, or reduction.65    
Brandon del Pozo suggests three facets of a test to determine 
whether police policies are effective.  “The first task would be to ensure 
that the policy is a moral end, and if it is not, that it does not interfere 
with what are ostensibly moral ends.”66  This indicates that police 
departments should carefully consider and prioritize the moral ends that 
their policies are constructed to achieve.  For example, crimes against 
persons would be given more attention than crimes against property.67  
                                                          
60 Id. at 276. 
61 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 50 (1997); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL 
LAW 9-11 (4th ed. 2003). 
62 LAFAVE, supra note 61, at 11. 
63 del Pozo, supra note 54, at 272. 
64 Id. at 274. 
65 Id. at 272. 
66 Id. at 273. 
67 Id. 
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The second facet of the test is that “[t]he policy must try to meet its 
stated goal without violating the moral rights and freedoms of citizens in 
its practice.”68  This requirement involves determining when it is 
acceptable to curtail moral rights or freedoms to achieve a policy end.  
The third requirement is that “[t]he policy must not in and of itself take 
on an added negative moral significance by neglecting certain other 
moral duties.”69  For example, a community might be experiencing a 
high number of shoplifting thefts.  However, a police policy directing all 
of the department’s resources to this problem and neglecting more 
serious crimes of robbery and murder is both negligent and illogical.     
Considering del Pozo’s factors in light of racial profiling, a police 
policy that singles out an individual for criminal investigation solely 
because he is of a particular race or ethnic group would be immoral 
within itself, and it cannot be the means to any legitimate moral end.70  
Such a policy blatantly offends the moral rights and freedoms of equal 
protection of the law, and the negative effect of alienating the targeted 
group thwarts the primary purpose of pre-arrest criminal investigation.71  
However, a police policy that completely prohibits the use of race as a 
factor in certain limited criminal investigations may ignore sound law 
enforcement techniques that can help reduce crime.72  As a result, in 
limited situations, race has been accepted as a legitimate factor that 
officers may use when conducting certain criminal investigations.73   
A. Is Race a Factor that Police Officers Use When Deciding Who To Stop? 
It is an accepted axiom that race alone cannot initiate a police 
officer’s decision to stop and investigate an individual.  However, when 
                                                          
68 Id. at 274. 
69 Id. 
70 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1, provides for equal protection of the law for all citizens. 
71 YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 4 (11th ed. 2005).  The commentators explain that in 
pre-arrest investigations notes that there are three basic groups of pre-arrest investigative 
procedures: “(1) police procedures that are aimed at solving specific past crimes known to 
the police . . . ; (2) police procedures that are aimed at unknown but anticipated ongoing 
and future criminal activity  . . . ; and (3) prosecutorial and other non-police investigations 
conducted primarily through the use of subpoena authority.”  Id. 
72 Sean P. Trende, Why Modest Proposals Offer the Best Solution for Combating Racial 
Profiling, 50 DUKE L.J. 331, 361 (2000).  Trende states that “it seems that racial profiling is, to 
a certain extent, a rational reaction to the current realities of society, and that eliminating it 
would exact a toll upon society by removing a somewhat-effective crime-fighting 
technique.”  Id. 
73 See United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1985).  Race may be 
considered as one of the factors contributing to a founded suspicion of criminal conduct, 
although race alone cannot justify an investigatory stop.  Id. 
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looking for criminal traits, police officers look for traits which they 
believe correlate with criminal behavior.74  More often than not, the 
officer associates criminal or deviant behavior with conduct—a 
mannerism, language, or an appearance—that differs from his.75 The 
race or ethnicity of the suspect is the first factor that a police officer 
notices.  It becomes a relevant factor in suggesting criminal behavior 
when the officer considers what is different about the suspect.76  
However, officers suggest that factors other than race or ethnicity 
actually alert their attention to an alleged suspect.77   
In United States v. Taylor,78 the arresting officers suggested that they 
noticed the suspect because of the suspect’s “obviously agitated conduct 
and appearance.”79  In United States v. Avery, officers noticed a young 
African-American walking hurriedly, and subsequently stated that they 
suspected the defendant because of his demeanor.  In both cases, the 
suspect was an African-American. 80  
These cases suggest that after racially identifying an individual, an 
officer begins to look for other characteristics that may give him 
reasonable suspicion to stop the person for an investigation.81  If asked, 
the officer justifies his initial stop of the suspect by referring to other 
acceptable factors, such as agitated conduct, hurried demeanor, or 
unusual appearance, and leaving race out of the equation.82   
                                                          
74 Thompson, supra note 55, at 986. 
75 Id. at 987.  Thompson suggests that police officers bring to their trade preconceived 
ideas about people and what are criminal traits.  Id.  These perceptions are often reduced to 
culturally embedded stories about groups.  Id.  One misnomer that officers apply is that 
people of color are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than whites.  Id.  As a result, 
discriminatory treatment is often a product of unconscious racism.  Id. 
76 Id. 
77 See United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992).  The court found that the 
initial encounter and search of the suspect was consensual.  Id.  The arresting officers stated 
that the suspect was poorly attired, but carried a new bag; he ran rapidly along the 
corridor, furtively scanning the course of his travel, and proceeded directly to the curb 
without claiming any baggage.  Id.  Even though the suspect was the only African-
American on the plane, the officers deny that he was singled out because of his race.  Id.  In 
United States v. Avery, officers noticed a young African-American walking hurriedly, and 
suggested that reasonable suspicion was based on the suspect’s demeanor and not his race.  
128 F.3d 974, 976-77 (6th Cir. 1997). 
78 956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992). 
79 Id. at 574. 
80 Avery, 128 F.3d at 976-77. 
81 Id. 
82 See id.; Taylor, 956 F.2d 572.  But see United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109, 113-14 (6th 
Cir. 1994).  In Harvey, an officer in court stated that “if the occupants had not been African-
Americans, he would not have stopped the car.” Id. 
Jones: A More Perfect Nation:  Ending Racial Profiling
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
634 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
If the race of the individual had never caught the officer’s attention, 
the purported suspect may very well have gone unnoticed.83  Randall 
Kennedy suggests that whenever race is a factor in determining who to 
stop and investigate, police officers cannot divest their perceptions about 
the crime and the race of the individual, and thus race becomes the 
primary factor in making the stop.84  Hence, in the police officer’s initial 
observation of criminal conduct, the suspect’s race may be more than 
just a factor; it may become the decisive factor in determining whether to 
make the stop and investigate the individual.85 
This can be seen in a case where an individual may be “out of 
place,” that is, in an area where the officer does not expect to encounter 
people of the suspect’s race,86 or the individual may be in an area where 
people of the suspect’s race are believed by the officer to engage in 
certain criminal activity.87  Assume that three young Mexican-American 
males are riding in an older model Oldsmobile in a mostly white upscale 
community or that a “preppie” young white male is in an all black 
neighborhood where several drug arrests have been made.  These 
seemingly innocuous observations will peak the officer’s interest in the 
individual and incite him to investigate.88  Supposedly, the race of the 
suspect is not the primary consideration.  However, the individual’s race 
is the pivotal factor that alerts the officer.  Subconsciously, the officer 
equates the race of the individual together with his peculiar location to 
mean that criminal wrongdoing is afoot.89 Based on inaccurate 
                                                          
83 See United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1352-53 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J., 
dissenting).  In his dissenting opinion, Judge Oakes stated, “One has the uncomfortable 
impression here that, but for the Hispanic appearance of Flores and Vasquez, they might 
not have been stopped.”  Id. 
84 See KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 148-49; see also Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 20, 1999, available at http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/ 
v99.n656.a02.html (noting that “in crime fighting, race matters”).  “When asked, most cops 
will declare themselves color blind.  But watch them on the job for several months, and get 
them talking about the way policing is really done, and the truth will emerge, the truth 
being that cops, white and black, profile.” Id. 
85 KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 148-49. 
86 See State v. Barber, 823 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Wash. 1992) (“racial incongruity, i.e., a person 
of any race being allegedly ‘out of place’ in a particular geographic area” could not be 
considered in the reasonable suspicion inquiry). 
87 Id. 
88 See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1992). 
89 See Thompson, supra note 55, at 987. 
Given the nature of law enforcement, stereotyping would appear 
integral to the police officer’s world.  Not only are police officers 
trained to enforce the laws and norms of our society, they are 
encouraged to investigate behavior that appears to them to be out of 
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perceptions of individuals of the suspect’s race group, the officer 
pursues a racially motivated hunch in an attempt to develop reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause to seize the individual.90 
In the above hypothetical case, race became a predominant factor in 
the criminal investigation.  It distorted the officer’s view of possible 
suspects, and he equated criminality to a race of people, rather than to 
an identified, accepted criminal profile.  The race of the suspect was 
misused by the officer to suggest that people of the suspect’s racial 
group are inclined to commit crimes.  In other words, the use of race or 
ethnicity in most cases  
permits a state actor to inject racist attitudes into the 
carrying out of what should be color-blind law 
enforcement. . . . The use of an immutable characteristic 
as the basis of suspicion for criminal activity is patently 
unconstitutional, and the notion that DEA agents and 
like state personnel can consider race in carrying out its 
duties is nothing short of outrageous and cannot be 
permitted.91   
B. If Race Can Be a Factor, How Should It Be Used? 
Because race is oftentimes misused by police officers, it is important 
to develop a solution that will ensure that when the use of a suspect’s 
race or ethnicity is permissible, an officer will not use an individual’s 
race or ethnicity to suggest criminal activity.  It is unconscionable to 
suggest that innocent persons of a racial or ethnic group must suffer 
constitutional infringements because of unfounded perceptions that an 
officer may have about the group.  However, a proper solution for racial 
profiling cannot totally remove race as a permissible factor in all 
criminal investigations.  Outlawing the use of race in every instance 
would not necessarily change police behavior on the street.92   
                                                                                                                                  
the ordinary. . .   The resulting mindset makes it more likely that 
officers will associate difference with deviance. 
Id. 
90 Id.  In the case concerning the preppie white youth, it is the neighborhood and its 
occupants that are suspect.  Id.  The officer stereotypes the neighborhood based on the race 
of its occupants and surmises that the white youth is associated with the neighborhood 
only because of the criminal nature of the residents.  Id. 
91 United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 582 (6th Cir. 1992). 
92 See generally Thompson, supra note 55. 
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Further, a wholesale removal of race from all criminal investigations 
may prevent police departments from effectively meeting appropriate 
objectives and carrying out proper departmental policies.93  Thus, any 
solution to eradicate racial profiling must ensure that there is a proper 
balance between the constitutional safeguard of equal protection and 
police policies that use race appropriately.  If race is permitted to be a 
factor, there should be clear guidelines concerning its use.  Accordingly, 
it is necessary to first define those situations where race may be used in 
ordinary criminal investigations. 
C. Permissible Uses of Race in Criminal Investigations 
Race has been accepted as a factor in ordinary criminal 
investigations in at least three obvious situations:  when a description of 
the suspect includes his race, when there is information about a certain 
crime spree that involves persons of a particular race or ethnic group, 
and when an investigation of criminal activity focuses on a one-race 
community.94  The United States Supreme Court has also validated the 
use of race or ethnicity in cases involving illegal drug trafficking and the 
entrance of illegal aliens.95 
1. Race as a Part of the Suspect’s Description 
One legitimate use of race in ordinary pre-arrest criminal 
investigations involves an officer’s response to a complaint that provides 
information about the suspect’s physical characteristics, including his 
race.  In United States v. Travis,96 the Sixth Circuit concluded that “race or 
ethnic background may become a legitimate consideration when 
investigators have information on this subject about a particular suspect.  
If, for example, officers know that a bank robber was white, the officers 
may limit their investigation to whites.”97  The officer’s investigation in 
this instance consists of no more than stopping a group of people who 
match the given description to see if any person in that group can be 
identified as the person in question.  However, the use of race as a factor 
in this situation should be narrowly tailored to meet the government’s 
interest in apprehending criminals.98   This suggests that officers should 
                                                          
93 See KENNEDY, supra note 34 (suggesting that race should be barred totally in 
determining suspicion in criminal investigations).  Kennedy believes the use of race should 
be illegal. 
94 These situations are explained more fully in infra Parts III.C.1-III.C.3. 
95 See infra Parts III.C.4-III.C.6 for details. 
96 62 F.3d 170 (6th Cir. 1995). 
97 Id. at 174. 
98 See Alschuler, supra note 33, at 184-85. 
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conduct their search for a person that matches the physical description in 
the general vicinity of the crime or in areas where evidence obtained 
from the crime may lead them.99  A search that is too broad—that is, a 
search that questions every person of the racial group, even those who 
are removed from the crime scene—abridges the Equal Protection 
Clause.100 
An example of a questionable use of race to identify a suspect is seen 
in Brown v. City of Oneonta.101  In Oneonta, a 77-year-old woman was 
attacked near Oneonta, New York.102  The victim reported to the New 
York State Police that her assailant was a young black male and that he 
had cut his hand with his knife during the attack.103  A police canine unit 
tracked the assailant’s scent from the scene of the crime toward the 
nearby campus of the State University of New York College at Oneonta 
(“SUCO”).104  Only two percent of SUCO’s students were black.  Based 
on this information, the police contacted SUCO and obtained a list of all 
black male students enrolled at the school.105  When this effort produced 
no suspects, the police conducted a sweep of Oneonta.  They questioned 
nonwhite persons on the streets and inspected their hands for cuts.106   
In a civil suit brought by several people who were questioned, the 
court found that police action did not deprive the plaintiffs of their right 
to equal protection under the law.107  It stated that the plaintiffs had not 
been questioned solely on the basis of their race.108  They were 
questioned on the altogether legitimate basis of a physical description 
given by the victim of a crime, and the police department’s policy was 
race neutral.109  The court found that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently 
allege that the police policies had a discriminatory intent.110   
But in Oneonta, the search conducted by the New York State Police 
was not narrowly tailored to meet the government’s crime-fighting 
goal.111  Remember, a police policy must try to meet its stated goal 
                                                          
99 Id. at 199. 
100 Id. 
101 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1999). 
102 Id. at 334. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 336-37. 
108 Id. at 337. 
109 Id. 
110 See id. at 337-38. 
111 See Alschuler, supra note 33, at 184. 
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without violating the moral rights and freedoms of citizens in its 
practice.112  The broad sweep of the city which was based on a 
description that consisted of race, approximate age, and gender alone 
singled black males out of the population for investigation.  A police 
policy that permits officers to question all persons of a particular race on 
a broad spectrum with such a minute description fosters a practice that 
offends the privacy freedoms of the targeted race. 
The Oneonta court’s suggestion that the impact of the investigation 
was reasonable, in light of the government’s interest because the number 
of black males in the city was negligible, is incredible.113  Let us assume 
that the suspect was a white male and the city’s racial composition was 
overwhelmingly black.  It is unthinkable that the police would conduct 
an investigation that would result in questioning practically every white 
male in the city for a crime that involved nominal injury to person or 
property.  This method of investigating the crime would be less likely to 
produce a suspect than it would to raise the ire of the public, especially 
those in the targeted group.114   
The theory of incompetently targeting one race of people was 
poignantly displayed in the case of serial killer Derrick Todd Lee in 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana.115  For months a criminal profile pointed to a 
white man.  However, once the profile was broadened, Lee, a black man, 
was arrested within the same week.  The one fact that ultimately 
dumbfounded people was that the final suspect was black, and serial 
killers “aren’t supposed to be black.”116  Inserting race clouds our 
judgment about who conducts certain crimes and lulls us into a false 
sense of security.117 
The identity of a suspect may be the most important variable that 
will assist officers in apprehending a criminal offender.  However, this 
                                                          
112 See Oneonta, 392 F.3d at 338-39. 
113 Id. at 334, 338.  The city of Oneonta has a population of just over 17,500 residents with 
an African-American student population of approximately 2%.  Id. at 338. 
114 State v. Lee, 879 So. 2d 173, 173  (La. Ct. App. 2004) 
115 Id. 
116 Issac Bailey, Race Can Hinder an Investigation, THE SUN NEWS (Myrtle Beach, S.C.), June 
9, 2003. 
117 Id.  Bailey states that racial profiling is 
like a proverbial woman who walks down the sidewalk late at night 
and spots an approaching black male and promptly darts across the 
street for safety.  She’d better be sure her fear is based on something 
other than race because she could be leaving the side of the street with 
Martin Luther King, Jr. and running into the arms of Tedd Bundy. 
Id. 
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goal is better served by structuring the search in a manner that is more 
likely to target the officer’s resources on potential suspects rather than an 
entire community.  The government’s goal in Oneonta would have been 
served by questioning black men who may have been seen in the area at 
the time of the crime, questioning black male students at SUCO on the 
evening of the crime, as the police dogs led the officers to the campus, or 
questioning black males in the city who may have recently committed a 
similar crime.118  An investigation based on the identification of a 
suspect by race conducted in this manner would have been more 
productive and less volatile. 
The methods that the government uses to apprehend a criminal 
should also consider the gravity of the offense committed.  This variable 
is important when weighing the government’s interest—criminal 
apprehension—against the infringement on the targeted citizen’s privacy 
interests.  The impact or severity of the crime will help determine the 
significance of the governmental interest and how the methods used to 
accomplish this interest should be tailored.119  In Oneonta, there was no 
death, violent injury, threat to a community of people, or significant loss 
of property.  Instead, the crime of interest in Oneonta was a burglary 
which ended in a brief struggle with the homeowner.  There was no 
report of a series of such crimes.  Thus, the sweep of the entire city was 
unreasonable considering the gravity of the offense committed.  The 
governmental interest in apprehending a burglar did not outweigh the 
enormous burden placed on the African-American men who were 
subjected to the government’s intrusion.120  A properly structured police 
                                                          
118 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE, supra note 9.  In explaining methods 
that should be used by law enforcement officers conducting specific criminal investigations 
the guidance policy states: 
[The] [r]eliance upon generalized stereotypes is absolutely forbidden.  
Rather, use of race or ethnicity is permitted only when the officer is 
pursuing a specific lead concerning the identifying characteristics of 
persons involved in an identified criminal activity.  The rationale 
underlying this concept carefully limits its reach.  In order to qualify as 
a legitimate investigative lead, the following must be true: [(1)] The 
information must be relevant to the locality or time frame of the 
criminal activity; [(2)] The information must be trustworthy; [and (3)] 
The information concerning identifying characteristics must be tied to a 
particular criminal incident, a particular criminal scheme, or a particular 
criminal organization. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
119 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985). 
120 See id.  “Apprehension . . . is a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable 
requirement.  To determine whether such a seizure is reasonable, the extent of the intrusion 
on the suspect’s rights under that Amendment must be balanced against the governmental 
interests in effective law enforcement.”  Id. 
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policy cannot take on an added negative moral significance.121  Focusing 
a large amount of resources on this crime may force the police 
department to remove officers from areas where there is a greater need.   
2. Race as a Factor When There Is Information About a Crime Spree  
Race is also an important factor in criminal investigations when 
police officers have credible information that persons from a certain 
racial group have been involved in a particular crime spree.122  For 
instance, assume police are aware that members of a street gang are 
bringing large quantities of drugs into their city from a certain source 
city.  If the members of the street gang are of a particular race, police 
officers will stop young men of the identified race who demonstrate 
characteristics of the gang and other criminal behavior related to the 
suspected crime.123  Such a stop is based on a police policy designed to 
prevent drug traffic in the city and may include surveying or watching 
young men who have characteristics that are unique to an identified 
suspected group.  That is, the police may look for young men who wear 
a certain color bandana, who are of a certain race, and who are arriving 
from a known source city.124  The above factors are considered in the 
totality of the circumstances.  Additionally, other factors that suggest 
criminal behavior should be considered before stopping a person of the 
targeted group.125 
The suspect’s race in this situation is a primary factor in deciding 
who to stop.  Is this racial profiling?  The practice does not suggest that a 
group of people is more inclined to commit certain crimes because of the 
race of its members.  The stops are focused and based on variables that 
are meant to prevent drug trafficking.  Race is not the sole factor used to 
make the stops.  Rather, the characteristics of members of the gang, the 
arrival point into the city, and the suspects’ reactions and mannerisms 
are all considered before engaging the person.  Further, the credible 
                                                          
121 Id.  The Tennessee statute authorized use of deadly force against unarmed, non-
dangerous fleeing suspect.  The Court said, “There is no indication that holding a police 
practice such as that authorized by the statute unreasonable will severely hamper effective 
law enforcement.”  Id.; see also del Pozo, supra note 54, at 273. 
122 Sharon Davies, Reflections on the Criminal Justice System After September 11, 2001, 1 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 45, 72-73 (2003); see also Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling 
Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1433-34 (2002). 
123 Characteristics of the gang may include dress, identifiable tattoos, etc.  Characteristics 
of the crime may be part of a criminal profile. 
124 See United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 172-73 (6th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. 
Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 350 (6th Cir. 1997).  A suspect’s race, in combination with additional 
circumstances and evidence, could constitute reasonable suspicion.  Id. 
125 See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
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information received by the department together with the current drug 
problem necessitates an investigation that is narrowly tailored to meet 
the governmental end.126 
3. Race as a Factor When Investigating Crime in a One-race 
Community  
Assume that a police department decides to place more officers in a 
predominantly black neighborhood because the residents of the 
community have complained about an increase in drug activity.  Officers 
assigned to patrol the neighborhood aggressively pursue young black 
males who they believe are involved in drug activity.  All of the stops for 
drug investigations in the neighborhood are of young black males.  
Police officers making the stops suggest that the stops are based on the 
officers’ experiences when dealing with drugs in a black 
neighborhood.127  The officers indicate that they consider factors such as 
age, appearance, vehicle driven, actions of the suspects, time of day, and 
where the persons of interest are located.128  But the citizens in the 
neighborhood suggest that the officers are engaging in profiling young 
black men.  Are the stops based on the race of the suspects or a police 
policy to reduce drug activity? 
“As long as a department’s goals are moral and properly ordered, 
and barring . . . negligence, policies may be enacted, repealed or changed 
to meet the sensibilities and expectations of the citizens they serve.”129  
However, citizen dismay or disapproval of a police policy should not 
result in the changing of a policy to one that will not meet governmental 
goals and that will neglect other moral ends.130  A moral end of the 
                                                          
126 See Alschuler, supra note 33, at 184. 
127 See DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK, 
24-26 (2002) (explaining Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), by stating that the case permitted 
officers to take preemptive steps to investigate crime where they had reasonable suspicion 
founded upon the officers observations and reasonable inferences a well-trained and 
experienced officer could make from those inferences). 
128 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). 
In the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the 
balance between the public interest and appellant’s right to personal 
security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police 
interference. . .   When such a stop is not based on objective criteria, the 
risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits. 
Id.; see also City of St. Paul v. Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that 
officers could not stop an individual solely on the basis that he was a stranger in an area 
known for crime; the stop must be based on grounds sufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion). 
129 See del Pozo, supra note 54, at 273. 
130 Id. 
Jones: A More Perfect Nation:  Ending Racial Profiling
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
642 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
policy in the above hypothetical situation is to reduce drug crimes in a 
neighborhood where such crimes have caused concern.  To achieve this 
end, the police department increased its presence in the affected 
neighborhood.  As long as the police policy of increasing their presence 
in the black neighborhood and aggressively pursuing suspects who 
match the characteristics and demeanor of those who may engage in 
drug crimes is aligned with the goal of crime reduction, the policy does 
not offend constitutional rights or privileges.   
However, the tactics that police officers use to address the drug 
problem must be properly designed to meet the stated goal of crime 
reduction.131  The tactics used may be based on police officers’ 
experiences in dealing with drugs in the targeted neighborhood and 
reasonable suspicion gained during their surveillance of possible drug 
suspects.132  They cannot be unreasonable or overly aggressive in their 
pursuits.133   
Race in the above instance is a factor because of a compelling 
governmental goal in reducing crime by reducing drug traffic in a 
targeted neighborhood.  When conducting their investigations, officers 
will use their experience to determine the tactics to be used when 
responding to crimes.134  Their experiences in a particular neighborhood 
will also help officers draw their own conclusions about the use of race 
and other variables as factors of potential criminality.135  The individuals 
stopped in the hypothetical situation were not stopped solely because of 
their race, but rather because of a combination of characteristics which 
led the officers to believe that they were involved in drug trafficking.  
Though race was a factor in the stops, it was not used in a manner that 
suggests officers were targeting a particular racial group because of a 
belief that they are more inclined to engage in criminal activity; it is only 
a factor because of the report of increased drug activity in a one-race 
neighborhood.  As a result, unless it can be shown that the manner of 
carrying out the policy contained a discriminatory intent, the use of race 
                                                          
131 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).  “[T]he permissibility of a particular 
law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”  Id. 
132 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
133 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
134 See Terry, 392 U.S. 1. 
135 See Goldberg, supra note 84.  An interview with an officer reveals that he uses his 
intuition and experiences gained from his tenure as a highway patrol when determining 
who may be a criminal suspect.  Id. 
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is not racial profiling.136  Thus, there is no violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
The use of race as a factor in cases where an identity is given of the 
suspect which involves his race, where there is a crime spree which 
involves individuals of a certain race or ethnicity, or where crimes are 
investigated in one-race neighborhoods seems to meet an appropriate 
police policy that does not offend constitutional protections.  Race in 
these instances is not used to single-out or insidiously label particular 
groups of individuals as criminals because of their race.  In each of the 
situations a complaint is made or facts are known that give details about 
the race of the suspect.  When race is used in this perspective in 
conjunction with other variables, it can assist police departments with 
detecting and preventing criminal activities.  In particular, race permits 
the investigating officers to narrow their search to individuals who are 
more likely involved in the suspected criminal activity.137   This focused 
search can hasten the investigation and possibly prevent other criminal 
acts by the suspect.  Here, the inclusion of race as one factor used to 
conduct the criminal investigation is the most sensible and logical means 
to pursue the complained of criminal.  The profile information used in 
these examples is the same that would be used by officers in other 
criminal investigations regardless of the race of the suspect.138 
As suggested by Randall Kennedy, “The law should authorize police 
to engage in racially discriminatory investigative conduct only on 
atypical, indeed extraordinary, occasions in which the social need is 
absolutely compelling:  weighty, immediate, and incapable of being 
addressed sensibly by any other means.”139  Race should be used in 
ordinary criminal investigations only when it is imperative to meet a 
non-discriminatory goal of the crime prevention or detection.  In the 
above situations, the race of the individuals was used only to help police 
meet a proper policy goal and it was not as a proxy for criminal activity.  
                                                          
136 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461 (1996). 
137 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE, supra note 9 (explaining police 
investigation of a suspected individual). 
138 See RICHARD G. SCHOTT, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, THE ROLE OF RACE IN LAW 
ENFORCEMENT: RACIAL PROFILING OR LEGITIMATE USE?  (Nov. 2001), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2001/november2001/nov01p24.htm. 
139 See KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 161. 
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4. Profiling in Drug Enforcement Agency Drug Investigations Has 
Been Permitted 
Besides permitting the use of race in instances where it is important 
to ordinary criminal investigations, courts have recognized that the race 
or ethnicity of a suspect may provide valuable information in drug 
interdiction cases when combined with other known or observed 
characteristics of individuals who may commit such crimes.140  Police 
officers are entitled to assess the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the subject of their attention in light of their experience and 
training.141  In doing so, the officer will look for variables that will 
suggest to him that criminal activity is afoot.142  These variables may 
include the dress of the suspect, where he is located, how he responds to 
the officer’s initial inquiries, excessive nervousness, or attempts to avoid 
the officer.143  The list goes on and on. 
Generally, when investigating drug crimes at international 
checkpoints, police officers use drug profiles to identify possible 
suspects.144   In United States v. Berry,145 the court listed several basic 
characteristics that make up a drug courier profile.   
The seven primary characteristics [listed by the court in 
Berry] are:   
(1) arrival from or departure to an identified source 
city;  
(2) carrying little or no luggage, or large quantities 
of empty suitcases;  
(3) unusual itinerary, such as rapid turnaround 
time for a very lengthy airplane trip;  
                                                          
140 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
141 See SCHOTT, supra note 138. 
142 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
143 See Brian Wilson, The War on Drugs: Evening the Odds Through Use of the Airport Drug 
Courier Profile, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 207 (1996). 
144 See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 491 (1983).  Royer was observed at Miami 
International Airport by two plain-clothes detectives of the Dade County, Florida, Public 
Safety Department.  Id.  The detectives believed that Royer’s appearance, mannerisms, 
luggage, and actions fit the so-called “drug courier profile.”  Id.  The officers placed Royer 
in a small room, took his identification and ticket, and retrieved his luggage from the 
baggage area.  Id.  The Court found that Royer had essentially been arrested by the officers 
and that his appearance and conduct in general were not adequate grounds for probable 
cause.  Id.  But, the Court surmised that the facts in the case were enough for suspecting 
Royer of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his luggage while they 
attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions in a manner that did not exceed the limits of 
an investigative detention.  Id. 
145 670 F.2d 583, 599 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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(4) use of an alias;  
(5) carrying unusually large amounts of currency in 
the many thousand of dollars, usually on their 
person, in briefcases or bags; 
(6) purchasing airline tickets with a large amount of 
small denomination currency; and  
(7) unusual nervousness beyond that ordinarily 
exhibited by passengers.  
The secondary characteristics are[:]  
(1) the almost exclusive use of public 
transportation, particularly taxicabs, in departing 
from the airport;  
(2) immediately making a telephone call after 
deplaning;  
(3) leaving a false or fictitious call-back telephone 
number with the airline being utilized; and  
(4) excessively frequent travel to source or 
distribution cities.146 
The court noted that using a profile is nothing more than an 
administrative tool of the police and that the presence or absence of a 
particular characteristic on a profile is of no legal significance in the 
determination of reasonable suspicion.147  It is the totality of the 
circumstances that will dictate whether the officer can stop the suspect 
and investigate further.   
In United States v. Sokolow,148 the Supreme Court approved the Drug 
Enforcement Agency’s use of profiles in drug courier cases.  The Court 
stated, “A court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable 
suspicion must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that 
conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a ‘profile’ 
does not somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by 
a trained agent.”149  It is the profile together with the articulable factors 
that prompts a stop of the suspect and not the profile alone.  
Although race or ethnicity is not listed as a part of the drug courier 
profile, it has become a part of the totality of the circumstances used by 
officers to help them identify who to stop for questioning about possible 
                                                          
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 600. 
148 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
149 Id. at 11. 
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drug activity.150   Considering a suspect’s race in drug investigations is 
permitted if the officer can articulate factors that, when cumulated, 
would give him reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect is 
engaged in the prohibited activity.151  However, race or ethnicity alone 
will not establish reasonable suspicion for a stop.152  In sum, courts have 
not found that the use of race as a variable in drug interdiction cases 
offends recognized constitutional protections as long as the officer’s 
encounter with an individual is not based solely on the suspect’s race.153   
5. Using Race in Border Patrol Cases 
Similarly, the use of race or ethnicity in a profile is seen in border 
patrol cases.  In Nicacio v. INS,154 a Chief Patrol Agent for the 
Immigration and Nationalization Service testified that, in making 
roving-patrol stops, his subordinates considered, in addition to Latino 
ethnicity, a “dirty, unkempt appearance,” a “lean and hungry look,” and 
“wearing work clothes.”155  Profiles were used by the officers in a similar 
manner as those used in drug interdiction cases.  The factors stated in 
the profile seemingly apply as much to innocent travelers as they do to 
an individual smuggling people illegally into the United States; but in 
fact, the factors suggest ethnic profiling.  Nonetheless, the Court in 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte found that the factors sufficed as 
alternatives for the stop and neither race nor ethnicity was considered 
alone.156   
                                                          
150 Sheri Lyn Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 234 
(1983).  Most officers would state that race is not a factor in determining who to stop.  Id. 
151 See United States v. Avery, 821 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1987). 
152 Id. 
153 See United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 173-74 (6th Cir. 1995).  Travis complained that 
she was targeted by the officers because of her race.  Id.  The court held that officers may 
stop an individual for several reasons, one of which may be race.  Id.  There is no 
Fourteenth Amendment violation as long as some of these reasons are legitimate and can 
equal to reasonable suspicion.  Id.  In United States v. Weaver, the court concluded that 
Hicks [the investigating officer] had knowledge, based upon his own 
experience and upon the intelligence reports he had received from the 
Los Angeles authorities, that young male members of black Los 
Angeles gangs were flooding the Kansas City area with cocaine.  To 
that extent, then, race, when coupled with the other factors Hicks relied 
upon, was a factor in the decision to approach and ultimately detain 
Weaver. 
966 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 1992).  The court found that the suspect’s race along with the 
other factors were enough to give Officer Hicks reasonable suspicion to stop Weaver.  Id. 
154 768 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1985). 
155 Id. at 1137. 
156 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976). 
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Specifically, the Court emphasized that ethnicity is an important 
consideration in border patrol cases.  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Powell asserted that “even if it be assumed that such referrals [for stops] 
are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, we perceive 
no constitutional violation.”157  That the Border Patrol relies on apparent 
Mexican ancestry at the checkpoint is clearly relevant to the needs of law 
enforcement.158  Although Latino ethnicity could not itself create the 
reasonable suspicion required for a roving-patrol stop, the likelihood 
that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough in 
an area near the Mexican-United States border to make Mexican 
appearance a relevant factor.159 
6. The Problems Race and Ethnicity Present in Drug Interdiction and 
Border Patrol Cases 
In drug interdiction and border patrol cases, the use of race or 
ethnicity to help officers identify who to investigate presents special 
concerns.  On its face, in drug trafficking or interdiction cases, the data 
that makes up the drug profile is race neutral.160  Purchasing airline 
tickets with large amounts of cash, a rapid turnaround time for a very 
lengthy airplane trip, or carrying large amounts of currency in briefcases 
or bags are activities that are not unique to any race or ethnic group.161  
However, statistics indicate that most individuals stopped for drugs at 
airports or other points of entry are racial or ethnic minorities.162  This 
                                                          
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975). 
Even if they saw enough to think that the occupants were of Mexican 
descent, this factor alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that 
they were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed other 
aliens who were illegally in the country. . .   The likelihood that any 
given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make 
Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not 
justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens. 
Id. 
160 See supra text accompanying note 144 (characteristics that make up a drug profile). 
161 See supra text accompanying note 144 (characteristics that make up a drug profile). 
162 See United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 1992) (Keith, J., dissenting).  In 
his dissent, Judge Damon J. Keith writes, 
The disproportionate number of African-Americans who are stopped 
indicates that a racial imbalance against African-Americans does exist 
and is implicitly sanctioned by the law enforcement agency.  The 
assumption that seventy-five percent of those persons transporting 
drugs and other contraband through public modes of transportation 
are African-American is impermissible. 
Id. 
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phenomenon suggests that race or ethnicity is an extremely important 
factor in determining who to stop and investigate.  In border patrol 
cases, the Court has not sought to mask the permissive use of ethnicity 
as a factor to suggest reasonable suspicion.163  It has only tongue-in-
cheek suggested that the ethnicity of the suspect cannot be the only 
factor that initiates the stop.164     
It appears that courts have permitted the use of race in drug 
interdiction cases on the hypothesis that experienced officers can 
distinguish a drug courier, and the essential need to curtail drug 
trafficking should yield to that experience.  Hence, if the race of the 
suspect is a variable that the officer uses in making his assessment, then 
we must suffer it to be.  The same rationale applies to preventing the 
entry of illegal immigrants into the United States.  The Court has 
justified the use of ethnicity in border patrol cases by finding that the 
class of violators is composed of persons who are likely to appear to be 
of Mexican descent, and thus, ethnicity is a relevant factor.165  The result 
is that the Court is willing to give officers wide discretion in protecting 
the borders from illegal immigration.   
By giving officers such broad latitude of discretion in drug 
interdiction and border patrol cases, courts have given officers de jure 
authority to offend the principles of equal protection and those 
principles contained in the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.166  Racial and ethnic minorities are 
                                                          
163 See United States v. Marinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873. 
164 Marinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873. 
165 Marinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873. 
166 See supra note 28 (providing the text of the Fourth Amendment); see also Ann Mulligan, 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: The Constitutionality of Drug Interdiction Checkpoints, 93 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 227, 227-28 (2002) (discussing the Court’s efforts to protect 
individual liberties in roadblock cases).  Mulligan states 
Had the Court followed the principles it set forth in earlier roadblock 
cases, it would have been forced to uphold the drug interdiction 
checkpoints as constitutional.  Instead, the majority of the Court 
created an arbitrary distinction that has no basis in prior case law or in 
the wording of the Fourth Amendment.  As a result, current roadblock 
case law has become confusing and illogical—the Court solved nothing 
and despite its attempt to preserve individual liberties under the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court failed.  States can easily circumvent the 
Court’s decision and establish roadblocks identical to the roadblocks 
struck down in Edmond simply by taking care to articulate a primary 
purpose that the Court has deemed acceptable.  As a result, the Court’s 
promise to protect Fourth Amendment rights is hollow and illusory.  
Increased litigation and uncertainty about the types of roadblocks that 
are constitutional will likely result. 
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asked to pay a high cost in the effort to eliminate these crimes.167  They 
are singled-out not because of criminal activity, but because of their race 
or ethnicity.  However, some suggest that race is only a small part of the 
equation used to support reasonable suspicion for the stops.168  Other 
factors exist that may very well have been enough for the officer to 
conduct the investigation and stop the individual.169 
It is obvious that race has permeated criminal investigations.  Some 
uses of race as described above appear to be legitimate; however, others 
are insidious.  It is these insidious uses of race that have caused the ills 
perpetuated by racial profiling discussed earlier in this Article.  In order 
to repair a society that is often fractured by race, it is important that real 
solutions to racial profiling are discovered.   
IV.  COURT EFFORTS THAT MAY ASSIST WITH THE PROBLEM 
A. Batson v. Kentucky 
Assume that an African-American family is traveling on Interstate 
10 from Lake Charles, Louisiana, to Houston, Texas, at approximately 
3:00 a.m.  This stretch of highway is known to law enforcement officers 
to be a popular corridor for drug traffickers. A Texas Highway Patrol 
officer notices the car with several people inside.  The officer is unable to 
distinguish the gender of the passengers or their ages, but he does 
identify them as black.  The officer follows the car for about two minutes 
and stops it.  He tells the driver that he was pulled over for traveling 68 
miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour speed zone.  He then asks the driver 
where he is going at that time of the morning and why he chose to travel 
so late.  The driver explains that he is taking his family to Astro World 
and to a baseball game in Houston.  The officer asks the driver if he can 
search his vehicle, but the driver denies the request.  The officer issues 
the driver a traffic citation for speeding, which is later dismissed by a 
local prosecutor.    
                                                                                                                                  
Id. 
167 See KENNEDY, supra note 34. 
168 Several informal interviews were conducted with Baton Rouge and New Orleans City 
police persons and Louisiana State police persons who stated that race was not the only 
factor used to help them determine whether a person is involved in criminal activity.  The 
person’s demeanor, such as if he ran when he saw police and his reaction to the police 
encounter are more important than the person’s race.  The interviewees suggested that race 
was never the sole factor.  It is a combination of several factors that will lead them to 
investigate a particular person. 
169 These other factors are based on the reasonable suspicion standard developed in Terry 
v. Ohio, which is discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 127, 132, 134. 
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It is highly unlikely that the officer stopped the vehicle because it 
was speeding.  This pretext was used to initiate contact so that the officer 
could investigate his unilluminated hunch of drug activity.  In this 
instance, he has used the race of the individuals in the car to suggest 
criminal involvement.  No other plausible explanation exists for the stop, 
and thus, it violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.170  The case of Batson v. Kentucky171 and the recent interpretation 
of Batson in Miller-El v. Dretke,172 may provide insight on how to address 
this and other impermissible uses of race or ethnicity in criminal 
investigations.   
In Batson, the Supreme Court found that an individual could not be 
excluded from a jury solely on the basis of his race.  The Court stated 
that the defendant is guaranteed that individuals of his race will not be 
excluded from the jury venire “on the false assumption that members of 
his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors.”173  By denying a 
person the right to participate in the jury process because of his race, the 
state has unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror.174  
Hence, the race of a potential juror cannot be used to suggest that he is 
not qualified for jury service. 
In Batson, the Court allowed statistical proof to show discriminatory 
intent on the part of Kentucky prosecutors in their use of peremptory 
strikes to remove African-American jurors from cases where the 
defendants were African-Americans.175  The Court held: 
To establish such a case, the defendant first must show 
that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that 
the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to 
remove from the venire members of the defendant’s 
race.  Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the 
fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that 
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection 
practice that permits “those to discriminate who are of a 
mind to discriminate.”  Finally, the defendant must 
show that these facts and any other relevant 
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor 
                                                          
170 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
171 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
172 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005). 
173 Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. 
174 Id. at 87. 
175 Id. at 95. 
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used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the 
petit jury on account of their race.  This combination of 
factors in the empanelling of the petit jury, as in the 
selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of 
purposeful discrimination.176 
“Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts 
to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging 
black jurors.”177  The court then determines whether the defendant has 
proven purposeful discrimination.178  The prosecutor must articulate a 
neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried, and his 
explanation cannot be based on his intuition about potential jurors of a 
particular race.179  That is, belief that the potential black juror is more 
inclined to be biased in a case where the defendant is black is prohibited.   
Applying the Batson analysis to an allegation of racial profiling 
would require the defendant to show that the officer has purposefully 
discriminated against others of his race when investigating criminal 
activity.  To do this, the defendant would not need to show an extended 
pattern of discrimination by the officer.180  The defendant could make 
out a case of purposeful discrimination by a totality of the relevant facts 
surrounding the stop.181  Once the defendant has shown discriminatory 
intent, the burden would shift to the state to articulate a racially neutral 
reason for the police officer’s stop and investigation of the individual.182   
Batson required that the State give a plausible explanation for the 
actions taken by the prosecutor.183  Federal courts interpreted this 
plausible explanation to mean any reason that the prosecutor asserted 
for excluding a juror other than race or ethnicity.184  The prosecutor’s 
explanation needed only to be facially neutral.   
                                                          
176 Id. at 96 (internal citations omitted). 
177 Id. at 97. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 80. 
180 Id. at 95. 
181 Id. 
182 This statistical requirement cannot be the same as that mentioned in most cases 
analyzing the Equal Protection Clause and racial profiling.  The Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Miller-El v. Dretke gives us guidance on the type of statistical information that 
may prove purposeful discrimination.  125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005). 
183 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 80. 
184 See id. at 97-98; People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350, 355 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Peart, 
197 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); People v. Duncan, 177 N.Y.S.2d 187, 193 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1992). 
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However, in Miller-El v. Dretke,185 the Court explained that the 
explanation given by the prosecutor for excluding racial minorities from 
the jury had to be more than just facially neutral.186  Specifically, the 
Court concluded that some reasons given by the prosecutor may be false 
even though they appear to be facially neutral.187  As a result, the trial 
court judge may be required to look beyond the reason given to 
determine whether there is an intent to discriminate on the basis of 
race.188  Even if the trial judge or appeals court can imagine a reason for 
excluding black jurors that might not have been false or can think of 
some rational basis for excluding blacks, if the reason given does not 
hold up when the totality of the facts are considered, it must not be 
accepted.189  “A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in 
thinking up any rational basis.”190 
Applying this to a pre-arrest criminal investigation, the officer’s 
explanation for making a stop must indicate an appropriate basis other 
than race.  This explanation must be more than just race neutral, it must 
include factors that when considered in totality suggest to a well-trained 
officer that the suspect was involved in criminal activity.191  The trial 
court should weigh the factors articulated by the officer and the 
defendant’s allegation of a discriminatory racial intent.  If the reasons 
given by the officer are weak and suggest a pretext, the trial judge 
should find that racial profiling has occurred.192  The trial judge must be 
willing to discredit an officer’s reason when strong evidence suggests 
that his only motivation for making a stop was the race of the suspect.193  
This will prevent an officer from camouflaging his true intent by 
providing some illogical, yet race neutral, explanation for his actions. 
                                                          
185 Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. 2317. 
186 Id. at 2325. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 2325-31 (finding that the numbers alone suggested a racial motivation for 
striking blacks from the jury).  Out of twenty black members of the 108-person venire 
panel, only one served.  Id. at 2325.  Although nine were excused for cause or by agreement, 
ten were peremptorily struck by the prosecution.  Id.  The prosecutors used their 
peremptory strikes to exclude 91% of the eligible African-American venire members.  Id.  
The Court also looked at the side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who 
were struck and white panelists allowed to serve.  Id. at 2325-26.  It found that the proffered 
reason for striking some black panelists applied just as well to white panelists.  Id. 
189 Id. at 2332. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 See Thompson, supra note 55, at 1001. 
193 Id. 
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In the foregoing hypothetical situation, the officer’s explanation for 
stopping the vehicle—that the car was speeding—is facially neutral.  
However, it is very uncommon for an officer to stop a vehicle and give 
its driver a traffic citation for exceeding the speed limit by only three 
miles per hour.194  The most logical explanation for the stop is the race of 
the individuals in the car and the officer’s intuition that people of the 
occupants’ race, traveling that stretch of highway at that time of night, 
must be involved in drug trafficking.   
The Batson reasoning may also be applied to the five situations 
identified earlier in this Article as accepted uses of race in criminal 
investigations.195  In cases where race is a part of the suspect’s 
description, the investigating police officers may not stop every 
individual of the suspect’s race on the basis of race only.  To stop every 
individual of the reported race of the suspect suggests that there is a 
pattern of intentionally investigating people of the identified racial 
group without evidence that the stopped individuals were involved in 
the crime.196  Such a pattern of indiscriminate stops of racially 
identifiable persons shows a discriminatory intent on the part of the 
investigating police department.   
When making stops to investigate crimes in this situation, the 
department must consider factors other than the suspect’s race.  These 
factors may include the time and location of the reported crime, the 
nature of the crime, evidence of modus operandi that may suggest certain 
known individuals, or other legitimate investigative leads.197  A 
legitimate investigative lead must meet at least three requirements.  
First, the information must be relevant to the locality or time frame of the 
criminal activity.198  Second, the information must be trustworthy.199  
Last, the information concerning identifying characteristics must be tied 
to a particular criminal incident, a particular criminal scheme, or a 
particular criminal organization.200  The race of the reported suspect may 
be considered, but it cannot be used to suggest that persons of the 
suspect’s race are guilty because they happen to be the right skin color.   
                                                          
194 I presented this scenario to three traffic officers.  None indicated that he would have 
given the driver a ticket.  As a matter of fact, they all indicated that unless there were more 
variables—such as the driver weaving, driving reckless, or bringing attention to himself—
they would not have even stopped the vehicle. 
195 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986). 
196 Id. 
197 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON RACE, supra note 9. 
198 See id. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
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The same analysis may apply when there is information about a 
crime spree or where officers investigate crimes in a one-race 
community.  The officer cannot use race as an indicator that individuals 
of certain groups are inclined to be involved in criminal activity.201  He 
must be able to articulate racially neutral explanations for his stop and 
investigation of individuals under these conditions. 
In drug courier and border patrol cases, Batson and Miller-El may be 
especially relevant.  If Batson and Miller-El are properly applied, the 
government will no longer be able to use race or ethnicity as the most 
salient factor in identifying possible suspects.  The suspect’s race or 
ethnicity could not be a factor that supports some other facially neutral, 
but illogical explanation for the stop.  The government must show that 
the officer’s stop of a person at an airport for drugs or the border for 
illegal immigration was motivated by factors which suggest that the 
person is involved in the suspected crime.202  Then the trial judge must 
examine the government’s explanation for its veracity and its tendency 
to show that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
suspect was involved in criminal activity.203 
B. Bollinger v. Grutter 
Another approach that may help ensure race is used properly in 
criminal investigations can be found in Bollinger v. Grutter.204  In Grutter, 
the Court held that race could be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way 
to determine admission to the University of Michigan School of Law.205  
The Grutter decision permitted the Law School to consider race as one 
factor among many, in an effort to assemble a diverse student body.206  
Race could be considered as a “plus factor” in an applicant’s file; 
however, it could not be the sole determining factor.207  The Court 
recognized racial diversity in higher education as a compelling 
governmental interest, which may meet the strict scrutiny standard of a 
                                                          
201 See SCHOTT, supra note 138. 
202 See Miller El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2317 (2005). 
203 Id. 
204 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
205 Id. at 2342. 
206 Id. at 2345. 
207 Id.  “The Law School’s current admissions program considers race as one factor among 
many, in an effort to assemble a student body that is diverse in ways broader than race.”  
Id. 
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reviewing court.208  However, to do so the program must be narrowly 
tailored.209 
In any context, an individual’s race or ethnicity is a suspect 
classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and racial classifications imposed by the government must 
be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.210  However, to 
attain the important governmental goals of crime prevention and 
detection, it may become necessary to consider the race or ethnicity of an 
individual in qualified instances.211  But, a departmental policy that 
encourages police officers to use race as the determining factor in 
criminal investigations would offend the tenets of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  “Textbook equal protection 
analysis therefore suggests that when the police employ a racial 
classification in investigating crime, the critical question is simply 
whether this classification is ‘narrowly tailored’ to advancing the 
government’s crime-fighting goal.”212  As stated in Bollinger v. Grutter, 
when race is essential to meeting a compelling governmental interest, it 
may be one factor among many, a “plus factor,” but not the determining 
factor.213  
For example, in the case of a criminal investigation where an 
identification of the suspect includes his race, a police officer may 
consider the race of the individuals he stops.  However, he cannot 
indiscriminately stop all persons of the suspect’s race.  Other factors 
must be considered and the use of race must be narrowly tailored to 
meet the governmental goal of crime prevention or detection.  Race can 
be one factor among many, but not the factor that prompts the officer to 
initiate contact with a particular person.  The officer must consider the 
location and time of the crime, possible escape routes for the suspect, the 
gravity of the offense, etc.  Race is only important because the officer 
knows that he is looking for a person from an identified race.  The race 
of the individual should not motivate officers to stop a supposed suspect 
for investigation.   
When race initiates the stop, it is not used as a “plus” factor in the 
totality of the circumstances, but rather, it becomes the defining factor in 
                                                          
208 Id. at 2339-42. 
209 Id. 
210 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337. 
211 See SCHOTT, supra note 138. 
212 Alschuler, supra note 33, at 184. 
213 See Miller El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2345 (2005). 
Jones: A More Perfect Nation:  Ending Racial Profiling
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
656 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
determining who to stop and investigate.214  Race becomes the “super 
plus” factor that alone in the officer’s view warrants the stop.  If race is 
appropriately used as a “plus” factor among many factors, serious 
consideration will be given to important evidence that suggests that the 
supposed suspect is somehow related to the crime and is not being 
singled-out solely on the basis of his race. 
Even though I suggest the approach advanced by the Bollinger v. 
Grutter analysis as a tool to help eliminate inappropriate racial profiling, 
I do not believe that it is a cure-all.  In border patrol cases and drug 
interdiction cases where race has become an essential variable in 
determining who to stop, it is important that governmental officers are 
not given carte blanche to use the race or ethnicity of an individual in 
such a manner that it becomes a “super plus” factor.  In these cases, it is 
almost impossible to prevent officers from giving great deference to the 
supposed suspect’s race when investigating purported violations.215  The 
officer’s experiences and attitudes when investigating illegal 
immigration and drug interdiction crimes indicate to him that he should 
stop individuals with particular physical traits.216  It is impractical to 
believe that we can change the officer’s innate opinions or what he has 
learned from his experiences while investigating these crimes.217  
Because of his innate opinions and experiences, invariably, with or 
without conscious intent, the individual’s race becomes the most 
important factor that prompts the officer to make a stop.218 
Accordingly, in cases concerning illegal immigration or drug 
interdiction, a combination of Batson and Grutter may present a better 
approach for eradicating racial profiling.  This combined analysis would 
allow race to be a “plus” factor among other relevant factors to give an 
officer reasonable suspicion for a stop.  However, because race is a factor 
and it is given enormous weight by officers in these investigations, the 
government must be able to articulate a racially neutral explanation that 
would have given reasonable suspicion for the stop. 
Assume that an officer notices a tractor trailer at the border with two 
men that have a “Mexican appearance” in the cab.  Because the men are 
                                                          
214 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343.  “When using race as a ‘plus’ factor in university 
admissions, a university’s admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that 
each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race 
or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.”  Id. 
215 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 543 (1976). 
216 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 84. 
217 See Thompson, supra note 55. 
218 See id. 
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crossing the border at a point where illegal entrance has been a problem 
and they are using a vehicle that can transport several people, the 
officer’s attention is peaked.  The officer watches the tractor trailer as it 
makes a turn from the main highway to a less traveled road.  Unaware 
that he is being observed by the officer, the driver of the truck pulls to 
the side of the road.  He and his passenger enter the trailer and appear to 
yell at someone or something in the trailer.  They get back into the cab.  
When the driver notices the police officer, he becomes visibly nervous 
and slows the truck to a snail’s pace.  The officer pulls the truck over and 
inquires about the itinerary of the two.  Their stories are conflicting and 
both are evasive.  The officer asks what they are transporting; they 
answer livestock.  When he does not notice any ventilation for livestock, 
or the smell that livestock generally emanates, the officer asks if he can 
look inside the trailer.  His request is denied.  At this point, the officer 
detains the two until he can get a telephone warrant from a local judge. 
In the above situation, the first factor that became visible to the 
officer was the Mexican appearance of the two men.  However, a 
combination of the other factors suggests that “Mexican appearance” 
was not the defining factor for the officer stopping the vehicle.  The 
government in this hypothetical could articulate other factors justifying 
the stop that are racially neutral, even though the ethnicities of the driver 
and his passenger were factors. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Racial profiling is not a novel phenomenon.  Because we have 
neglected its effect on race and society, however, it has become a 
crippling problem.  Pre-arrest criminal investigations suggest that 
officers are more concerned about a suspect’s race than whether he is 
involved in criminal activity.  As a result, it is oftentimes the race of the 
suspect that dictates the officer’s actions. 
It is important that efforts are reinitiated to end racial profiling.  
These efforts must include more than mere discussions.  They must 
prompt affirmative action from the courts and legislators.  The 
suggestions included in this Article are meant to reignite a waning 
discussion. 
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